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momentum and comparisons of performances in the areas of economy and democracy became 
a regular practice. Around late 1990s the two countries took different trajectories, although in 
the direction of EU and market economy. The great divergence is lying primarily in the 
choice of monetary regime. While Romania continued to pursue and enhance its discretionary 
monetary policy and since 2005 has moved to inflation targeting, Bulgaria made an abrupt 
turn in mid-1997 and introduced a currency board arrangement.  
 
In this paper, we investigate how the monetary regimes choice shaped the structure of both 
economies and the behaviour of the public and private sector, how they modified the 
mechanisms of adjustments and how they concentrate risks. We discus the institutional 
compatibility of monetary regimes with EU accession and EU membership using the 
theoretical insights form Dooley (1997, 2000) insurance model hypothesis. One of the main 
hypotheses, which we illustrate empirically, says that Currency board concentrate all 
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discretionary monetary policy leads to greater public debt growth and lower fiscal discipline. 
EU integration as well as the current crisis has different effects when combination with 
different monetary regimes.  
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From Prosperity to Depression:  
Bulgaria and Romania (1996/97 – 2010) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Bulgaria and Romania are neighbouring countries, which have always been rivals. Their fates 
have intertwined on many occasions in history as in the time of the Ottoman rule or within the 
socialist bloc; often at war – sometimes as allies, other times as enemies fighting against each 
other (during the latest history one vivid example is the Inter-Ally War of 1913, or the two 
World Wars). Their rivalry, this time in peaceful environment, continued after the 
disintegration of communism. Initially, it was which of the two would be quicker to depart 
from the past and which would outdo the other in adopting the institutions and catching up 
with the standard of living in Western democracies (i.e., which would make “the transition to 
market economy and democratic world” earlier). At a later stage, in mid-1990s, the 
competition was about which would be faster and more successful in integrating into the 
European Union. The very philosophy of EU enlargement, which was the outcome of 
disintegration of the bipolar world, presupposed the principle of competition and strife 
between the member-states expected to demonstrate and achieve certain results. It was 
presumed that this would create incentives for development, discipline and innovation. How 
successful this philosophy was, is difficult to judge definitely, even more so when taking into 
account the difficulties of realisation of its alternatives. Alternative in a sense in building 
transitional forms for erstwhile socialist countries to cooperate and share common monetary, 
economic and even political to some extent institutions which, as the processes evolved, 
would “merge into” the European systems1.  
 
Following the decision on EU enlargement to include Bulgaria and Romania (late 1999) and 
with membership negotiations already started (2004), the race between the two countries 
gained momentum and comparisons of performances in the areas of economy and democracy 
became a regular practice2. Since the two countries joined the EU (2007) their rivalry has 
                                                 
1 An example of a similar idea is the proposal of Jacques Attali, who in early 1990 advised the creation of a 
payment union between the former European socialist countries based on the ECU that would help them avoid 
exchange rate disruptions and smoothly adopt the monetary institutions of the West.  
2 Respectively in February and March 1993 the European Union signed with Romania and Bulgaria, 
respectively, association agreements, or “European Agreements”, as a first step to the membership negotiations, 
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never stopped, fostered by their aspirations for more influence within EU, in particular for 
euro funds reception, for admission to the euro area by way of achieving nominal and real 
convergence, and recently, for overcoming the global crisis. 
 
Having followed relatively similar models of development, around late 1990s, more precisely 
1996/1997, the two countries took different trajectories, although in the direction of EU and 
market economy. The great divergence is lying primarily in the choice of monetary regime. 
While Romania continued to pursue and enhance its discretionary monetary policy and since 
2005 has moved to inflation targeting, Bulgaria made an abrupt turn in mid-1997 and 
introduced a currency board arrangement. The currency board, which operates to this day, is 
an extreme orthodox form of monetary regime resembling the gold-exchange standard, a 
negation in principle of monetary policy3. The two radically different monetary regimes were 
in operation when the two countries gained their EU membership and later on, when the 
current crisis began. These regimes contributed to shaping the behaviour of economic players, 
the academia, and the public consciousness, building up and structuring their preferences to 
such an extent that today it is almost impossible to find a Romanian who would object to the 
active monetary policy, or a Bulgarian, who would disapprove of the currency board and 
would rather have a “Romanian” monetary policy conducted instead. 
 
In late 1990s, and especially in early 2000, the two economies witnessed a period of 
economic upswing and growth, which ended abruptly in the last months of 2008 when it 
became clear that the initial hopes for decoupling of the European peripheral countries were 
in vain4, and that the crisis reached the Balkans.  
 
In our view, the theoretical and practical interest in comparing the two countries and their 
evolution over the period 2000 – 2010 is unquestionably motivating, especially because it is 
rarely undertaken. It has relevance for a number of reasons at least. 
 
First, it arouses one’s curiosity as to why Bulgaria and Romania chose to operate two 
radically different regimes in late 1990s despite their similar development at the onset of 
transition and the fact that they were in for a similar future – EU membership. How was it that 
                                                                                                                                                        
this only a little more than a year after signing such agreements with Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 
(December 1991).  
3 See Schuler (2007), Desquibet and Nenovsky (2004). 
4 See Sanfey (2010), Gardo and Martin (2010). 
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the two regimes penetrated so deep in the mass consciousness so as to shape peculiar 
cognitive type models of how money and monetary authorities function and the way they 
should function? 
 
Second, it would be interesting to see to what extent the diametrically opposite monetary 
choices have determined the overall development of the two countries given that the monetary 
institution is system making and money is at the core of the institutional structure of society5. 
At a more concrete level, the question is about how and by what mechanisms the monetary 
regime impacts fundamental behaviours such as saving and investment, the correlation 
between domestic and foreign saving, the condition of public finances, the overall level of 
debt and the debt structure, credit behaviour and credit structure, etc.? In other words, it 
would be interesting to investigate whether and to what extent the monetary regime is neutral 
over a long as well as short-term horizon in relation to the achievements and characteristics of 
the economies, something which is often upheld by one group of economists and just as often 
challenged by another. 
 
Third, the comparative perspective allows us to see the effects of the two opposite monetary 
regimes by taking account of the fact that the other characteristics of the two countries in late 
1990s, when the choice was made, were relatively the same and an upshot of the communist 
legacy. To put it otherwise, we are witnessing a kind of a natural experiment, whereby it is 
possible, under certain conditions, of course, to judge about the efficiency and impact of the 
two opposite monetary regimes: how much these regimes have contributed to the formation of 
the specific profiles of the two economies; the dynamics and forms of the economic upsurge 
after 2002, and the extent to which they have moulded resilience and adaptability of the two 
economies to the current crisis. 
 
The decade, which we have chosen for analysis, namely the period 2000 – 2010, covers both 
the period of growth and credit upsurge, driven by the low interest rates on the international 
markets and the expectations for EU membership, as well as the period of loss of discipline 
following the accession to EU in 2007, coinciding with the start of the global financial crisis, 
spilled over to the two countries in late 2008. Since then, Bulgaria and Romania have been in 
the grip of the crisis as reflected in a sharp contraction of the capital inflows and the credit 
                                                 
5 See Ball (1999), Maurer (2006), Abdelal (2001). 
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crunch, a surge in the risk premia and reduced economic activity. The direction of 
deteriorating public finances is evident, although less pronounced in Bulgaria. Romania had 
to sign an two years agreement with IMF (March 2009) and borrow funds from EU, EBRD 
and the World Bank (the total amount is around EUR 20 billion). 
 
The fourth theoretical point, which could be highlighted by comparing the development of 
Bulgaria and Romania, and which is often overlooked, is the institutional complementarity of 
the monetary regime with the other economic and political institutions, i.e., their systemic 
character. The institutional analysis of the economies in transition over the last ten years has 
achieved significant results; however quantification of institutions and institutional reforms is 
still rarely performed (on the subject see Coricelli and Maurel, 2010). In this analysis we 
examine in more detail the compatibility of the monetary regime with the expectations for 
membership and EU membership itself, as well as how much the currency board (Bulgaria) or 
the discretionary monetary policy (Romania) fits or conflicts with the process of euro 
integration, given that the monetary regime and the Euro membership are specific basic social 
anchors. In other words, we enquire into the nature of the dynamics of interaction between 
these two anchors6.  
 
And fifth, the period of prosperity and crisis under review, 2000 – 2010, allows us to make 
some parallels with another decade associated with the years of the Great Depression between 
the Two World Wars. The years from 1925 to 1940 are strikingly reminiscent of today’s 
developments. In spite of the existing differences, they allow us to explore a range of 
theoretical and empirical hypotheses, and provide ground for reflection on the existence of 
certain cyclic recurrence and repeating (not deterministic) patterns of a number of economic 
behaviours and country preferences. It may as well be a sheer coincidence, but the above 
decade reveals similar to today’s differences between Bulgaria and Romania, more 
specifically with regard to the preferences for monetary regime and fiscal policy. In spite of 
the difficulties, Bulgaria steadfastly adhered to the principles of the gold-exchange standard 
(Bulgaria introduced it de facto in 1926 and de jure in 1928). Romania carried out a monetary 
and financial stabilisation somewhat later (with some delay); it introduced the gold-exchange 
standard in 1929 and devalued in 1936 following the devaluation of the French franc. 
Similarly, today, Bulgaria is obsessed with compliance with fiscal discipline and strictly 
                                                 
6 On the subject see an earlier study by Ialnazov and Nenovsky (2011), and Nenovsky (2010) 
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services its external debt obligations (is perhaps the strictest payer of all countries with 
reparations), whereas Romania defaulted in 1933. In 1931 the two countries introduced a 
systematic exchange control, which is often considered as de facto abandoning of the basic 
principle of the gold-exchange standard, namely the free movement of gold and foreign 
currency (Wandschneider, 2008, p. 155). Things are much more complex, and the exchange 
control in the two countries could be interpreted mainly as a temporary safeguard of the gold 
standard, as a reaction against the devaluation of the British pound and the currencies that 
followed suit, as a needed protection of the country’s gold reserve and manageable servicing 
of the external debt. The case in point is not about abandoning the principles and philosophy 
of the gold standard, but rather of negating the principles and philosophy of the floating 
exchange rate and managed money. Although in these years monetary orthodoxy was still 
wide spread, as well as a legacy of the pre-war classical period of gold standard and fiscal 
discipline, we can claim that the views and behaviour of Bulgarian economists and bankers 
are relatively more orthodox than those of their Romanian counterparts are. On the whole, the 
ideas of “managed money” (upravliavana moneta in Bulgarian and monede operat in 
Romanian) and of different types of industrial policy and protectionism were received much 
more readily in Romania than in Bulgaria (let us recall the international popularity enjoyed by 
Mihail Manoilescu’s theory on new protectionism). Of course, later on all differences were 
left to the past with the two countries taking the road of wartime economy and war 
preparations. Going back in history to the time of the Great Depression makes it possible to 
discover and explain the recurring economic and political choices of the two countries, if we 
are disinclined to accept them as curious repetitions of the situation today (part 4). 
 
In this study, after exposing the history of Bulgarian and Romanian monetary regimes (part 2) 
we attempt to build analytical framework first theoretically, where we put forward our 
hypotheses, then empirically by illustrating them with statistical data and examples from the 
political economy of the two countries (Part 3). In this way, we seek to contribute to the 
development of the larger discussion of the differences across economic systems, in the case 
of the Balkan countries, the post-communist economies, or capitalism in general. As well as 
indirectly – to the analysis and explanation of the diversity and variety within the European 
Union, their forms, causes and implications for the overall European economic and monetary 
policy. From a much broader perspective, our study elaborates the meeting point between the 
general theoretical explanation and formalisation on the one hand, and the historical concrete 
and contextual manifestation, on the other.  
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II.    The battle of monetary regimes: Currency board versus Monetary policy  
 
As was already pointed out above, our focus is on the two opposite monetary regimes chosen 
by Bulgaria and Romania in late 1990s. The debate about the choice of monetary regimes, 
and their relative efficiency according to the countries’ characteristics, the interrelation 
between credibility and flexibility, the types of shocks, etc. is old and publications are 
numerous. So very numerous in fact that as one Arab scholar from the past once said: “Oh 
Allah, help me from drowning in so many names”. In order to avoid drowning in the sea of 
names, we will give a brief overview of the history of monetary regimes in Bulgaria and 
Romania, without discussing in details the major achievements of the theory of monetary 
regimes.  
 
After around a seven-year period of active discretionary monetary policy (1989-1996/97) in 
Bulgaria and an extremely deep financial, monetary and subsequently political crisis, in late 
1996 and early 1997 a decision was taken for the introduction of a currency board 
arrangement. Although debates as to who initiated Currency board continues to the present 
day. Since the beginning was clear that it was IMF and the country’s major creditors (which is 
where the loans for building a start-up foreign reserve of the currency board initially came 
from), who wished to see a stable and credible monetary regime in place as well as a country 
able to service its external debt (currency boards have a high propensity to accumulate foreign 
reserves). The new arrangement agreed with the desires of the poor and middle strata of the 
population who lost money in the hyperinflation and the failure of banks. From a 
macroeconomic and institutional perspective, Bulgaria needed a break from the prolonged 
developments of bandit transition in which through the banking system and the central bank 
losses were monetised and assets and liabilities, legacy from planned economy, were illegally 
and unfairly redistributed7. Bulgarian economy was in a non-cooperative game equilibrium, 
similar to prisoner dilemma (Ialnazov and Nenovsky, 2011).  
 
As is known, a currency board is an extremely restrictive monetary system in which the 
monetary policy is practically eliminated with the exception of statutory reserve management 
and regulation of the banking system. Law fixes the exchange rate, and monetary base is fully 
                                                 
7 For details see Dobrinsky (2000), Nenovsky and Rizopoulos (2003), Berlemann and Nenovsky (2004) and 
Vucheva (2005), on post Currency board period Minea and Rault (2009). 
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covered by highly liquid foreign asset, the coverage being made public weekly through the 
release of the Currency Board balance sheet. The LOLR function in Bulgaria has been 
reduced to specified situations of systemic risk, as determined by means of defined levels of 
the condition of the payment system, and within the surplus of the foreign reserves over the 
liabilities of Issue Department. The essential here is to remember that on the asset side of the 
currency board’s balance sheet there are no domestic assets, no securities of the Bulgarian 
government, or claims on the banking sector. This makes monetary policy as we know it 
(open market operations, etc.) impossible8. The currency board is similar to (as well as 
different from) the gold-exchange standard, relying on the two major effects – credibility and 
discipline9. 
 
It is worth noting that the currency board was introduced after a deep crisis (according to 
some calculations, one of the severest crisis in terms of cumulative GDP loss), so population 
and elite alike accepted readily the new system, which very quickly (almost within weeks) 
became a major cognitive model and an way of thinking about economy and money. We can 
definitely say that the currency board, which subsequently outlived the Russian and the Asian 
crises as well as the collapse of the currency board in Argentina (curiously, even in this 
critical for currency board arrangements time, in Bulgaria the system received the public’s 
unreserved support and unfailing confidence), became the leading anchor10. The anchor pulled 
the country out of the critical situation of corruption and banditism and steered it to years of 
prosperity and successful EU membership. Subsequently, after some wavering regarding the 
economic and legal compatibility of the currency board with Bulgaria’s membership in EU, 
and the adoption of the exchange-rate mechanism in particular, the European institutions 
decided in favour of its compatibility although it remained a unilateral responsibility of the 
country operating it. Today, Bulgaria and Lithuania continue to operate their currency boards, 
while Estonia is the only Currency board country that joined the euro area following the 
beginning of the financial and debt crisis in Europe (as of 1 January 2011). The issue of 
whether the currency board today is of disadvantage or of benefit to Bulgaria in the current 
crisis is open to dispute. However, the facts show that the Bulgarian public continues to 
                                                 
8 For details, see Gulde al. (2008); Nenovsky and Hristov (2002), Schuler (2005). 
9 See Desquibet and Nenovsky (2004), Raybaut and Torre (2005). 
10 An anchor has a range of functionalities, but its prime merit is that it makes it possible to coordinate the 
expectations in a given direction and improves predictability and cooperation as a whole. For details, see 
Ialnazov and Nenovsky (2011).  
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regard it as a major institutionally proven anchor, although with the time passing the social 
memory about 1996/97 crisis begins to weaken (Mudd and al. 2010). 
 
Unlike Bulgaria, Romania has never given up its discretionary policy and its central bank has 
always held the full range of tools typical for any contemporary and modern bank. Even after 
Bulgaria made its choice to operate a currency board and somewhat later when the currency 
boards, and corner solutions in general gained wide popularity, Romania never hesitated to 
continue its path of active monetary policy and exchange rate management. It should be 
mentioned that Romania too experienced a similar in character, while not in depth, crisis in 
1996, followed by political elections won by the rightists (with all conventionalities) (similar 
to the elections in Bulgaria in June 1997)11. In 2005, after lengthy discussions and having 
declared its wish to join the group of countries from Central Europe (Poland, the Czech 
Republic and Hungary), Romania introduced flexible inflation targeting (see Isarescu, 2003). 
Despite the new monetary regime announced, the central bank of Romania has virtually never 
abandoned the exchange rate management (crawling peg to basket, or ….), as most vividly 
evidenced by the foreign exchange market intervention in the initial periods of operation of 
this regime. These interventions received the obvious support of Governor Mugur Isarescu as 
evidenced in his statements in the period 2005-2008 (Isarescu, 2009, p. 26)12, and still earlier, 
of Deputy Governor Christian Popa (Popa, 2003). It is also worthy of note that even in 
previous periods when non-intervention in the forex market and floating exchange rate were 
proclaimed, the bank de facto interfered, according to the calculations of Frommel and 
Shobert (2006). It should also be mentioned that inflation targeting implies a floating 
exchange rate because it is controversial (not to say impossible) for a central bank to employ 
two anchors at the same time, in this particular case nominal exchange rate and inflation13.  
 
After it became clear that Romania would not be bypassed by the crisis, its central bank 
started reducing the interest rates (4% cumulative reduction since the beginning of 2009), as 
well as the statutory reserves, pursuing a policy of monetary easing (IMF, 2010). The decision 
to increase VAT by 5 % (despite the 25% reduction of public sector wages and 15% reduction 
of social transfers) led to an automatic surge of inflation in mid-2010. This compelled the 
central bank to temporarily stop the trend of interest rate reduction and breaching of the price 
                                                 
11 For detailed account of the evolution of the Bulgarian political system from 1878 to present, see Todorov 
(2010). 
12 Isarescu speaks of cultural conditions for the adoption of inflation targeting (Isarescu, 2009, pp. 19-20). 
13 On departures from inflation targeting in the new member-states, see … 
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target (which was 3,5% + 1, with 7-8% inflation as of end-2010) (see IMF, 2010, NBR, 
2010). 
 
For the purposes of this analysis it would be important to note that the active monetary and 
exchange rate policy play a major role not only in the practice of Romanian monetary 
authorities, but also in the studies and analyses of Romanian economic researchers14. Apart 
form the research studies of the economists at the Central of Bank of Romania, who for 
institutional reasons support and propagandize the benefits of this type of active management 
of money, of inflation targeting, etc., it can be seen that in Romania exists, to put it that way, 
a full monopoly of theoretical and empirical publications, which eulogize this type of policy. 
The criticism is saved for particular decisions or technical details of conducting it. The 
opponents of the principle of discretionary monetary policy, let alone currency board 
adherents, are only a few, not to say none. Whenever a currency board arrangement is 
mentioned, it is strongly criticised and often ridiculed at as a primitive system applied to 
underdeveloped nations incapable of managing their own affairs15.  
 
Thus, both in Romania and in Bulgaria, two dominating models of conducting monetary 
policy as well as thinking of money and money management emerged. In Bulgaria, this 
philosophy is passive, extremely conservative and externally delegated. In Romania, it is 
active, discretionary and science-based, relying on a range of econometric and statistically 
measured elasticities between interest rate, inflation, etc. The publications of Bulgarian and 
Romanian economists also have their focus on different areas: while the majority of Bulgarian 
economists reject modelling and complex models (or, where they do employ them, they are 
aware that such models are rarely used), their Romanian counterparts publish numerous 
research studies on modelling the complex and multiple relations of active money 
management.  
 
                                                 
14 See, for example, Pelinescu and Cariani (2006), Daianu and Kallai (2008), Daianu and Luncu (2007). 
15 One of us had the chance to work over a longer period 1996 – 2008 with the Central Bank of Bulgaria, and he 
remembers well the contrasting views, generally ideologised and often sarcastic, held by Bulgarian and 
Romanian economists at different positions in and outside the Bank. Bulgarian economists, faced with an empty 
picture, argued that under a currency board everything was automatic and there was no need to do anything, and 
Romanian economists, faced with gigantic schemes of countless boxes and arrows showed how complicated and 
elaborate the relations were, adding that these were however controllable and manageable.  
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Why this polarization and what is is the role of the radically different choices of monetary 
regimes for the overall dynamics of the economies of Bulgaria and Romania in the years of 
economic upswing, EU membership and crisis? 
 
In an earlier study, one of us argues that post-communist countries in general are divisible 
into two groups, according to the type of monetary regime operated at the onset of transition 
(Nenovsky, 2009). The successful countries are the ones that started the transition with fixed 
exchange rates and strict monetary policies, part of which subsequently moved to a floating 
exchange rate (Central Europe), while others preserved it (the Baltic countries). This model is 
a winning one, because the fixed exchange rate regime gives more possibilities for 
overcoming the bandit and crony transition, and in general indicates willingness for 
integration into the European world, which is the new geostrategic choice. The group of 
losing countries includes those of the countries that started the transition with a floating rate, 
whose fluctuations provided a rich soil for manipulations and numerous embezzlement and 
bandit schemes. Romania and Bulgaria fell under the second group of countries.  
 
In order to explain the behaviour of the two countries in the last ten years, as well as answer 
the above questions, we need to systematise what we have so far presented into a theoretical 
framework.  
 
III. Theoretical hypotheses and empirical illustrations 
 
At this stage of the analysis it would be appropriate to formulate the following theoretical 
hypotheses, or theoretical assertions, which could subsequently be illustrated (we avoid using 
the term “proved”) by statistical data and empirical examples from the practice of the two 
countries.16.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The choice of monetary regime is largely decided by the initial situation of the 
economies, which on their part are conditioned by the last years of planned economy and the 
first years of transition. 
 
                                                 
16 Empirical illustrations are, of course, one of the possibilities of at least a relative verification of the hypothesis, 
along with the verification of the logic and the cause-and-effect relations. 
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According to this hypothesis, the choice of monetary regime is derivative of current basic 
characteristics of the economies of Bulgaria and Romania, as well as the initial years of 
transition, the inherited characteristics of the planned economy period and the characteristics 
of the two regimes, especially in the period of 1980s. It might be presumed that the initial 
conditions of the transition in Bulgaria, the high external debt above all, the strongly open 
character of the Bulgarian economy (as well as the strong dependence on the COMECOM) 
(see chart 1, 2 and tables 1 to 4). Respectively, relatively lower than Romania propensity to 
save, coupled with the higher rates of consumption and growth in the last years of 
communism, and conditioned the significantly deeper crisis in Bulgaria in 1996/97 compared 
with the crisis in Romania in 1996. Romania started the transition with an external debt of 
very low, a period of forced saving and consumption constraints during Nicolae Ceausescu’s 
regime, a much more closed and larger economy, more resources and possibilities for export 
and attraction of foreign savings. There are also definite reasons to believe that the inclination 
of Romanians to follow good examples and the influence from the West is more pronounced 
as compared to the scepticism and nihilism typical of Bulgarians. This applies not only to the 
two countries’ elites, but to the majority of their population as well. 
 
Although there is every reason to assert that during the first six-seven years of the transition in 
the two countries the processes had much in common economically and politically, this 
legacy is in our view fundamental for the depth of the crisis and the ensuing choice of 
monetary regime. The crisis is an important factor for institutional change and most 
importantly for a change in the preferences and expectations with regard to a monetary 
regime. The crisis in Bulgaria was very severe and systemic (it was political too); the 
population accepted unconditionally the radical change, while in Romania it was less severe, 
and the elections won by the reformists (reformist forces) preceded the crisis. Not only two 
monetary models of policy emerged – active and national (Romania) and passive and 
delegated abroad (Bulgaria), but also two cognitive models, two ideologies of thinking on 
money and developing economic and financial practices in general. The first model could 
conditionally be referred to as discretionary and Keynesian, while the second – as orthodox 
and conservative (and under certain conditionality – as liberal).  
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Chart 1 Foreign debt in Bulgaria and Romania (1985 – 1998) 
0
2000
4000
6000
8000
10000
12000
14000
16000
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
Bulgarian Foreign debt mln ISD
Romanian Foreign Debt mln USD
 
Source: National Bank of Romania Annual Report (1998); Vachkov and al. (2009) 
 
Chart 2 Romania: foreign debt, foreign reserve and budget balance (1985-1998)  
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 Source: National Bank of Romania Annual Report (1998); Vachkov and al. (2009) 
 
 Table 1  Import elasticity to Income                                                                  Table 2 Part trade with EU in the export and import of  
                                                                                                                              Bulgaria and Romania  
 
  COMECOM Developed 
countries 
Developing 
countries  
 Bulgaria  1966-1970  
1971-1975  
1981-1983 
1984-1986 
1987-1989 
1990-1992 
1993-1995 
 1.18 
 2.46 
1.05 
1.94 
-3.45 
2.61 
-7.86 
 0.85 
 3.67 
-0.35 
3.47 
-0.84 
-1.78 
-0.19 
 1.97 
 2.98 
6.29 
4.44 
3.18 
-0.41 
10.13 
Romania  1966-1970  
1971-1975  
1981-1983 
1984-1986 
1987-1989 
1990-1992 
1993-1995 
 1.18 
 1.06 
-1.26 
-10.66 
Na 
1.00 
3.56 
2.26 
3.65 
Na 
Na 
Na 
-5.83 
5.57 
 2.30 
 3.96 
Na 
Na 
Na 
0.69 
2.11 
Source:  Slim (1997), p. 65; p. 70
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
 Bulgaria  
      Export 
5.57 15.65 31.46 29.96 37.64 37.25
Romania 
      Export 
33.84 36.94 35.16 41.36 48.20 53.17
Bulgaria 
      Import  
11.51 26.08 35.51 32.81 37.50 38.05
Romania 
      Import 
21.78 28.72 41.27 45.31 48.21 49.58
Source:  Slim (1997), p. 72 
 
Table 3 
Gross national/domestic product or income per capita in Bulgaria and Romania in historical perspective 
 
 
1938 GNP (Bairoch,  
in 1960 US$) 
1937 NI 
(Berend, Ranki) 
1937 GDP 
(Maddison  
in Geary – 
Khamis $) 
1989 GNP  
(WB Atlas) 
2005 GNI 
(WB Atlas) 
2005 
GNI 
(PPP) 
FDI  
(million USD) 
Bulgaria 420 75 1567 2680 3450 8949 1989-1991     56 
1992-1993     82 
Romania 343 81 1130 1730 3910 9056 1989-1991     55 
1992-1993   170 
Source: see different sources in Petrovic (2008), p.128 
 
 
Table 4 
Political and economic transition in Bulgaria and Romania  
 
 
Democratization 
1999-2000 
Democratization 
2006 
Economic 
Transition 
1999 
Economic 
Transition 
2006 
Real GDP 
Level 1998  
(1989 = 100)
Real GDP 
Level 2004  
(1989 = 100)
Cumulative FDI 
per capita (US$) 
1989-2004 
Bulgaria 3.58 2.93 2.8 3.5 66 88 1050 
Romania 3.54 3.39 2.8 3.3 76 99 746 
Source: see different sources in Petrovic (2008), p.132 
  
Hypothesis 2 is closely related to the first one. It could be argued that choosing a 
diametrically opposite monetary regime radically changed the characteristics of the countries 
at least for the past 15 years. Owing to its systemic importance, the choice of monetary 
regime concentrated the economic activity, as well as the risks, in different ways in the two 
economies and shaped their basic macro characteristics. 
 
Because the currency board is a discipline-inducing and conservative mechanism, he gives the 
private sector more space and restricts the behaviour of the government. The economic 
activity and all risks concentrated in the private sector and the individuals (such as demand 
for credit, investments, etc.). The private sector is the one, which has to adjust to the hard 
budget constraints, to develop equilibrating mechanisms. The public sector and public 
finances follow by themselves the basic principles of behaviour of the private sector, i.e., the 
aim is about the two keeping a constant equilibrium and even generating net savings (budget 
surplus) (chart 3) . The requirement for the private sector adjustments, under fixed exchange 
rate and lack of monetary policy, leads to lower unit labour cots and wage flexibility (chart 4 
to 9)  
 
The situation in Romania counter-mirrors that in Bulgaria. Here, the public sector has no such 
restriction: it can always rely on the central bank, which in turn holds up its reformation and 
leads to deficits and accumulation of public debt. Hence, the debt structure tends to follow a 
relatively higher level of the public debt at the cost of the private one, whereas in Bulgaria the 
propensity of the private sector to incur debt is considerably higher than that of the public 
sector. This applies equally to the external and the internal debt. Moreover, the currency 
board, by reducing the foreign exchange risk, leads to moderation of the overall level of risk 
in the country and lowers the interest rate levels to those abroad, opening the economy and 
therefore increasing the country's exposure to external shocks. National economy follows 
passively global economy developments. 
 
Thus, in general, the Currency board, due to its system-making and "pulling“ importance, 
leads to deep changes in the other leading institutions and characteristics of the economy, 
either slower or quicker. The essential thing is that it creates conditions for the formation of 
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habits and discipline, and certain barriers to banditism and corruption, and all sorts of crony 
practices. 
 
Therefore, we logically arrive at the third hypothesis, which is related with the processes of 
EU accession and membership, and partly with the possibility of joining the euro area. 
 
Chart  3  Public balances in Bulgaria and Romania  
 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bulgarian National Bank 
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Chart  4  External Private Debt/ GDP in Bulgaria and Romania (1997 – 2010) 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bulgarian National Bank 
 
Chart 5   Government debt/ GDP in Bulgaria and Romania (1997 – 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bulgarian National Bank 
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Chart  6  Unit labour costs in Bulgaria and Romania (1997- 2007) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source:  
 
Chart  7 Bulgaria: credit dynamics (1997- 2010) 
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Chart   8 Romania: credit dynamics (2002- 2010) 
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Source: National Bank of Romania 
 
Chart   9 Nonperforming loans in Bulgaria and Romania (1997- 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: National Bank of Romania, Bulgarian National Bank 
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Chart  10 O/N interest rate in Bulgaria and Romania (2006- 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
 
Chart  11 3M interest rate in Bulgaria and Romania (2006- 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
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Chart 12 Sovereign debt CDSs  in Bulgaria and Romania (2006- 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg  
 
Hypothesis 3: We can assume and logically derive the relationship, according to which the 
EU membership as a second external anchor reinforces or weakens the influence of the 
monetary anchor (monetary regime), and the magnitude of this strengthening or weakening 
effect has to do with the type of the monetary regime. This could be analysed within the 
theoretical framework of insurance game model proposed in different context by Dolley 
(1997, 2000) or simply as a moral hazard dynamics17.  
 
Theoretically, the case in point is the compatibility or complementarity of two basic 
institutions, of two major social anchors, which form and coordinate the expectations of 
economic actors. There is every reason to assume that the monetary regimes and the EU 
anchor are in conflict, since the EU membership triggers behaviour, which clashes with the 
principles of behaviour under a currency board arrangement. This happens primarily after a 
country gains full membership in terms of loosening constraints, slackening discipline and 
increasing moral hazard.  
 
                                                 
17 The entire model is exposed in Nenovsky (2010), graphical interpretation in Nenovsky and Villieu (2011). 
Empirical illustration of the original Dolley’s model is given in Chinn and al. (1999). 
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The logic of this moral hazard (or insurance game a la Dolley) could be shortly exposed in a 
following way (for formal presentation see appendix). When government foreign assets 
became bigger that its foreign liabilities, the difference became to be viewed as collateral (free 
insurance) for private sector liabilities. This inflow of capital starts and the private debt, 
mainly foreign, but not only, start to rise. In fact, at the beginning the EU anchor and 
monetary anchor are rather compatible, because the EU credibility is reinforced by the 
discipline effect, but once membership realised these two effects start to contradict each other. 
The discipline is lost and the credibility effect has perverse effects. Our observation is in the 
close accord with Luengnaruemitchai and Schadler (2007) study of so-called EU halo effect 
on New members sovereign bond yields that became lower than can explained by 
fundamental, “A poor reason would be if markets mistakenly perceived EU mmebersgip as 
providing some sort of implicit guarantee against sovereign risk” (p. 20).  
 
Because of raising government collateral the moral hazard, take form as either private driven 
(in the case of Bulgaria, because of Currency board) or public driven (in the case of Romania, 
because of discretionary monetary policy)18. One of the proof of this behaviour is the growth 
of non performing loans taking speed with the time (chart 9), another one, as in the case in 
Romania is the loosening of the fiscal discipline (chart 5 and 6). Charts  14 and 15  also 
provides good illustration about the moral hazard (or insurance game) hypothesis. It is clear 
form the both graphic that the EU moment (somewhere between 2003 and 2005), was the 
starting point of the insurance game.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18 For some inspiring idea about crises classification, see Marzinotto and al. (2010). 
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Chart  14 Bulgaria public debt and foreign reserves 
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Chart   15   Romania public debt and foreign reserves 
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In sum, the monetary regime together with the EU effect, running through all phases of the 
current crisis, determines the concrete forms of manifestation of the crisis, the concentration 
and manifestation of risks in the different economies, the mechanisms and transmission 
channels of the crisis, the possibilities for reactions and the potential implications for the 
future. 
 
Of all said so far, we could derive one additional assertion when we look at another similar, 
although distant in time economic past, namely the years of the Great Depression of 1930s. 
Our point here is that within certain frames the current comparative history of Bulgaria and 
Romania repeats the comparative history of the Great Depression period. 
 
IV. Back to the history (1925-1940) 
 
Overall, the economic and political development of Bulgaria and Romania in the inter-war 
period did not differ substantially as evidenced by the key economic indicators, which 
although with some conditionality, were quite close, not to say the same. For political and 
geostrategic reasons the two countries found themselves in opposite camps during World War 
I, which had important economic implications for their choice of economic and financial 
policy.  
Being on the losing side in the war, Bulgaria lost territories and had to pay huge reparations as 
compared to its budget and wealth. Curiously, part of these reparations had to go to the 
Balkan countries, Romania including. France’s claims on Bulgaria were about 26 per cent of 
the total Bulgarian debt. Next in the creditors’ list were Italy at 25 per cent, Greece at 12.7 per 
cent and Romania at 10.55 per cent.  
 
The country’s foreign reserves were depleted; it faced harsh budget deficits and onerous 
external debts. Following the general principles of return to pre-war gold standard rules and 
the need for financial and monetary stabilisation, raised at the monetary conferences in 1920s, 
Bulgaria successfully carried out its own stabilisation (de facto in 1924 and de jure in 
1926/28). This was achieved at a new exchange rate of the lev to the dollar (the gold) and 
with the help of the stabilisation loans under the auspices of the newly established League of 
Nations (1926 and 1928), which ensured the foreign reserves needed for the coverage of the 
currency in circulation. The public finances were brought to balance mainly by restricting 
expenditures and the Central Bank conducted deflationary policy and a policy of high 
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discount rate. Overall, this policy did not differ from that of the other countries, neither in 
terms of philosophy, nor of practice. What actually became, over time, a distinctive feature of 
Bulgaria’s economic and financial politics, which subsequently came to prevail, was its 
orthodoxality and adherence to the principles of the gold standard, the fiscal discipline, and a 
strict and almost “martyr’s” servicing of the huge external obligations. Although Bulgarian 
politicians and economists repeated over and over again how huge and unfair the obligations 
were, as these truly were, Bulgaria continued to remit amounts due under various reparation 
debts. Governments fell one after another because of the difficulties to refund these debts, 
with the signing of new loan agreements, but payments never stopped.  
 
Bulgaria is among the few countries, perhaps the only one on the Balkans, which never 
defaulted. Due to its political isolation after WWI, however, its endeavours as a good payer 
were not recognised and it had to shoulder its liabilities with almost no relief (Ivanov, 2001, 
2004). In his speech marking the BNB’s 50th anniversary, then-prime minister Andrey 
Lyapchev said, “one would be hard put to find quite such a young nation in quite such 
exacerbated circumstances as ours these past fifty years, yet one which can boast that it has 
ever occupied the position of an exemplary payer to its foreign creditors” (BNB, 2001,135). 
 
Bulgaria is among the few countries that never abandoned the gold standard, and especially 
the fixed exchange rate. Bulgaria, like most other countries, introduced exchange control in 
1931, but unlike them, it never devalued. Although often argued that this type of exchange 
control is de facto abandoning one of the basic principles of the gold standard, there are a 
number of arguments to think otherwise. Because not only is it unclear why the exchange 
control in Bulgaria, as well as that in Romania, were so very different from the exchange 
control in England, or even France, for instance, it is also unclear when Bulgaria and Romania 
became full members of the bloc of countries running exchange control.  
 
Certainly, like today, the choice of an orthodox monetary regime in Bulgaria was initially 
dictated primarily by the condition of debt and public finances.  
 
As already mentioned, Bulgaria was a debtor country which considered debt service a key 
priority. In fact, Bulgaria was an extremely diligent payer who pursued to preserve its 
reputation through debt service. With respect to structure, Bulgaria’s debt was denominated in 
gold backed leva and was mostly owed to non-devaluing countries. According to the Royal 
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Institute of International Affairs, “in Bulgaria it is almost certain that the transfer question has 
predominated” (1936, 98) and the purpose of maintaining the currency on a gold basis “has 
presumably been to avoid an increase in the costs of the foreign debt service” (1936, 129). 
Even before reparation payments began in October 1923, foreign debt service reached the 
amount of 112 million gold francs in 1918 to 1922: 16.3 per cent of budget expenditure. 
Reparations under the Treaty of Neuilly were added to this, coming to 2250 million gold 
francs at 5 per cent annual interest over 37 years, plus occupation expenses. This represented 
a quarter of the national wealth. Sterling devaluation offered some relief to Bulgaria since its 
debt was predominantly in pounds. Debt service now accounted for 11 per cent of budget 
expenditure; there was no great BNB asset loss since a comparably small amount of assets 
was denominated in sterling (the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1936). Summarising 
the opinions of many economists at the time, a hypothetical devaluation would certainly 
increase national debt burden, while any possible advantages would be marginal. 
 
Later, the balance of payments constraints were particularly tight, and not only as regards 
foreign debt service. The prices of agricultural products, which accounted for the major part 
of Bulgarian exports, fell sharply on international markets and aggravated terms of trade. The 
September 1932 Stresa Conference which focused on possible assistance to Southern 
European countries (a major part of the so-called ‘agrarian bloc’) noted that the price drop 
reached 70 per cent (Bonnet, 1933, 21). A fund concentrating revenue from the sale of 
agricultural products to developed countries was proposed to be used as partial debt service 
(the United Kingdom vetoed it). 
 
Systematic exchange control could be interpreted as a defence against restrictions introduced 
by Bulgaria’s trading partners. The farming price drop was combined with a number of 
restrictions on the import of agrarian products to Germany and France with a view to 
protecting indigenous farmers through economic and political means (Raupach, 1969). 
Turkey, an important Bulgarian trading neighbour, also introduced some limitations on 
Bulgarian imports. In April 1932 the drachma joined the devaluers’ club and Bulgaria lost its 
competitive and long-standing positions on the Greek market.  
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Let us now turn to Romania19, which although, as was mentioned earlier, followed the trends 
common, first, for all countries, and second, for the Balkan and peripheral economies, it 
nevertheless had some important differences. Again, of significance was the initial debt 
situation. Being in the winners’ camp, Romania happened to be the recipient of reparations 
and became Bulgaria’s creditor (10% оf Bulgarian reparations were du to Romania). Its 
monetary and financial stabilisation was carried out relatively later, slower and with more 
difficulty.  
 
What is evident from the monetary developments and discussions in Romania of that period 
as compared to those in Bulgaria is the much more pronounced wavering of Romanian 
economists and politicians with regard to the monetary stabilisation, as well as their 
inclination to use external loans to develop their economy, rather than regularly service their 
obligations20. 
 
After the Wars, Romania’s economy followed similar developments as those in Bulgaria. 
The leu was slow to stabilise and lagged by a few years behind the stabilisation of the 
Bulgarian lev: the leu stabilised de jure only in 1929 (by a Monetary act of 7 February 1929), 
and on 18 May 1932 – by a radical introduction of a foreign exchange control, leaving the 
fixed exchange rate as the only trait from the gold standard. Of course, similar developments 
were witnessed in Bulgaria as well, and unlike Greece, neither Bulgaria nor Romania 
followed the devaluation of the pound. It would be interesting to note that Romania too had a 
problem with the initial foreign reserves as it was victimised by the Bolshevik authorities 
who confiscated its gold reserve (in early 1918) and refused to give back the gold deposited 
with the Russian Central Bank during World War I (December 1916). It might also be 
interesting to mention the role of a remarkable personality, the Bolshevik leader Christian 
Rakovsky (Bulgarian by origin, Romanian by citizenship, and revolutionary by vocation) 
who was a key figure in the story with the gold deposit. The gold had for a long time been 
accounted for in the balance sheet of the National Bank of Romania (unlike the National 
                                                 
19 See Madgearu (1939), Muresan and Muresan (2003), Blejan and al. (2008, 2009; 2010), For an overview of 
the economic situation on the Balkans during the Thirties, see Royal Institute of International Affairs (1936).  
20 In this period Romania is probably the most corrupted of all countries on the Balkans (Ahtik, 2009, p. 12). 
“Their society was deeply marked by the years under the corrupt Ottoman rule. Romanians had a saying: “The 
fish grows rotten from the head”. In Romania, almost everything was for sale: offices, licences, passports. 
Indeed, a foreign journalist who once tried to change money legally instead of on the black market was thrown 
into jail by a police officer who thought he might be involved in a particularly clever swindle.” (MacMillan, 
2003, [2001], p. 129. 
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Bank of Bulgaria, it was 90% owned by private shareholders) and was included in the 
coverage of the currency circulation only in 1929 during the legal stabilisation of the leu. As 
compensation, and following the liquidation of the Austro-Hungarian Bank, already in 
February 1922 the Ministry of Finance gave a portion to the Central Bank, which Romania 
received as indemnity along with war compensations (for details see Blejan and al., 2008; 
2010). 
 
In the case of Romania, a crucial role for retaining the fixed exchange rate and furthering 
stabilisation was played by the French economists and bankers (Charles Rist in particular). 
Rist was the head of the monetary mission to Bucharest and amid tough negotiations, he 
insisted on using the 7.5% loan of 1931 for stabilisation purposes contrary to what the 
Romanian economists wanted; i.e. for developing the economy (railways and funding of 
current costs). The story of the negotiations is analysed by Costache et al. (2009). They  
where clearly show the polarisation between the French economists (proponents of gold 
standard and stable money, and monetarists in general) and the Romanian economists whose 
primary concern was the development of the industry and the real economy, and who were 
not convinced about the necessity and efficiency of stabilisation, or of the need of regular 
servicing of foreign loans. 
 
Romania was much more productive and original in developing corporate and protectionist 
theories and one of the most remarkable economists, Mihail Manoilescu (1891-1950), who 
was in that period Governor of the Bank of Romania and who started as liberal economist, 
developed his groundbreaking protectionist theory applied to catching-up agrarian economies 
(for details see Bobulescu, 2003). Manoilescu’s book, which was initially published in 
French in 1929, was quickly translated into the main western languages, while in Bulgaria he 
was regarded as economist of international statue along with Werner Sombart. The 
translations of his books, the articles dedicated to him, as well as his visit to Bulgaria in 1933 
unequivocally show the time lag, with which Bulgarian economists embraced the views 
questioning the principles of classical political economy, including in monetary theory and 
practice (for details see Nenovsky, 2010). 
 
Third, already at the time of introducing the exchange control a fluctuation of the exchange 
rate within the band of 5%-15% occurred, and later on an exchange premium between the 
official exchange rate and the exchange rate on the black market. In November 1936 
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(following the devaluation of the French franc), de facto devaluation was realized by 
revaluing the gold reserves. Practically all foreign reserves of Romania are in gold). This 
devaluation is around 38% according to Blejan et al. (2009, p. 14) and 27.6% according to 
official records of the League of Nations (LN, 1938, p. 51)21
                                                 
21 The Table attached (as at end-1938) shows that of the countries with exchange controls only Bulgaria from the 
Balkan countries did not devalue. Other countries from the group of non-devaluing countries are Hungary, 
Poland and Germany. 
Table 5 
Population and income levels in Bulgaria and Romania 
 
 
Population in 
1920 (000s) 
Population in 
1939 (000s) 
% population in 
agriculture 
1930-1934 
Population 
growth rate 
1920-34 
Illiteracy rate % 
of 7-10 year 
olds 1930-34 
GDN per capita 
in 1929 (US 
1960 dollars) 
Bulgaria 4 847 6 305 75 1.30 31.4 306 
Romania 15 635 20 045 72 1.27 42.0 331 
Source: Adcroft (2006), p.5 
 
 
Table 6 
Indicators for Bulgaria and Romania 
 
 Indices of 
Agriculture 
Productivity in 
Calorie Units 
(average 1931-
35, Europe = 
100) 
Per person 
dependent on 
agriculture  
Indices of 
Agriculture 
Productivity in 
Calorie Units 
(average 1931-
35, Europe = 
100) 
Per male 
engaged un 
agriculture  
Indices of 
Agriculture 
Productivity in 
Calorie Units 
(average 1931-
35, Europe = 
100) 
Per hectare of 
agricultural land 
Surplus’ 
Agricultural 
Population 
Assuming 
Existing 
Production and 
European 
Average Per 
capita Level 
(circa 1930) 
% 
Rural 
Population 
(circa early 
1930s) 
Urban 
Population 
(circa early 
1930s) 
Infrastructure 
Levels Based on 
Five Components 
(transport, 
communication, 
housing supply, 
health care, 
educational and 
cultural services) 
Score 
(Rank 1920) 
Infrastructure 
Levels Based on 
Five Components 
(transport, 
communication, 
housing supply, 
health care, 
educational and 
cultural services) 
Score  
(Rank 1937) 
Bulgaria 47 55 80 53 78.6 21.4 14.2 (25) 13.9 (25) 
Romania 48 53 69 51.4 79.8 20.2 10.8 (26) 13.5 (26) 
Source: Adcroft (2006), pp.6-7, p.12, p.14. Infrastructure Levels Based on Five Components: for 1920: Denmark 75.3 (1); for 1937: USA 83.5 (1). 
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Table 7 
Germany’s share in the foreign trade in Bulgaria and in Romania,  
1933-1939  
 
 1933 1937 1938 1939 
Bulgaria  38.0 43.1 63.5 71.1 Export 
Romania 16.6 19.2 37.1 43.1 
Bulgaria 38.2 54.8 57.8 69.5 Import 
Romania 18.6 28.9 49.4 56.1 
Source: Raupach, 1969, p.85 
 V. Concluding remarks 
 
At a first glance, Bulgaria and Romania are countries, which do not differ much (aside form 
their Slavic and Latin origin, also debatable), which follow equal patterns of development and 
differ in the details. This article has attempted to prove that actually this is not so, and that 
there are essential differences, especially in the recent ten to fifteen years. 
We have offered an analytical model for the purpose, which mainly relates to the choice of 
monetary regime in 1996/97 when Bulgaria and Romania started on completely different 
trajectories. Bulgaria choosing a currency board arrangement – an extremely orthodox 
monetary system, which effectively eliminates the country’s monetary autonomy and 
Romania for its part continuing on the track of modern trends by following a discretionary 
monetary policy and even introducing inflation targeting. This difference, which in our view 
is dictated by the initial conditions of the two countries’ external debts (a large debt with 
Bulgaria and a small one with Romania), runs throughout the overall economic system of the 
two countries and their economic policy. Bulgaria being more in the direction of the “private 
sector”, concentrating both the economic activity as well as the whole range of shocks, 
response mechanisms and self-equilibrium, while in Romania, in contrast, it was the state and 
the public finances that played a significant role by being both a reason for and a response 
mechanism to imbalances.  
The polarity of choices of the monetary regimes shaped the ways of thinking of the 
economists and politicians of the two countries. While in Bulgaria, eulogy of static monetary 
regimes of the past prevailed and any form of activism was denied, it was quite the opposite 
in Romania where the economists vied with each other in constructing models and describing 
the complex mechanisms of inflation targeting and monetary policy. A look back at the inter-
war period reveals – perhaps accidentally or perhaps not – some recurring patterns of the 
behaviour of the two countries, which were then associated with monetary stabilisation and 
monetary regime. 
The EU membership plus excess liquidity globally, coupled with the difference in their 
monetary regimes, has led to two relatively diverging configurations of moral hazard 
behaviour. In Bulgaria, moral hazard and the insurance game after Dooley’s game model, 
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which we regard as appropriate explanatory theoretical miniature models, were concentrated 
in the private sector and the strong growth of private debt. In Romania, while not disregarding 
the indebtedness of the public sector, the public sector, public finances and public debt 
reacted much more quickly, thus leading to problems in 2009 and to the signing of an 
agreement with IMF. 
 
Today (early 2011), the future of the two countries is not clear, just as it is not clear how the 
present crisis will evolve. As an African saying goes, “When you don’t know where you are 
going to, better know where you are coming from”. 
 
The theoretical issue presented here about the role of the monetary regime as an economic 
anchor and its complementarity with the external (geo) political anchor, in this particular case 
EU is promising topic and deserves new theoretical and empirical analyses. 
 
 
Appendices:  
Formalization of insurance model (hypotheses 3) 
 
The model could be presented using the following functional relations (see for more details 
Nenovsky, 2010; and for graphical presentation see Nenovsky and Villieu, 2011): 
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Where equation (1) (the only one that we borrow from Dooley) shows demand for deposits by 
non-residents dd as a function of real interest rates on deposits r, risk-free real interest rates 
abroad r*, and additional return α, which non-residents would require in case of a lack of 
insurance. Demand for deposits grows with the increase of interest rates spread and declines 
with the increase of insurance premium. We introduce the equations (2) and (3) that capture 
the logic of our model extension. Equation (2) shows the negative link between this premium 
α and the collateral, in this case approximated with net external assets of the government, or 
even closer with foreign reserves F. Finally, equation (3) indicates the supposedly positive 
connection between the collateral's dynamics, F, and the power of the anchor’s credibility (in 
this case the monetary regime) λ1. 
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We are examining three periods, of course with all conditionalities. The first period, Т1, 
covers the time before the start of negotiations for EU membership. The second period, Т2, 
after start of negotiations until accession, and the third period, Т3, is the period after the 
official entry. While the first period is characterised by the existence of one anchor, in this 
case λ1, which reflects the monetary regime (either exchange rate target or inflation target), in 
the second and third period a second, already external, anchor emerges (EU membership), λ2. 
While in Т1 this anchor plays a mobilizing, stimulating and disciplining role for the countries 
heading for membership, and overall both anchors – internal and external – move in a single 
direction and act in synchrony.  
Thus in Т2: 
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The equation (4) describes the amplifying effect of the second anchor on the first anchor 
(+γ1). 
 
And in Т3: 
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In this period Т3 there is every logical and empirical evidence to assume that the second, 
external anchor – EU membership – brings detriment to and undermines the credibility of the 
monetary regime anchor (-γ1). Besides, in equation (3), we add the second anchor λ2 in 
explaining foreign reserves dynamics. Of course, at first approximation, the functional 
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correlations are taken as linear, which is clearly a simplification, because non-linear 
dependences could be surmised22. 
 
In Т1, after transformations, we arrive at the following dependence between insurance 
premium and anchor credibility: 11101011010 )( λβαβααλββααα −−=+−= .  
From where it follows that 011
1
<−= βαλ
α
d
d , and the elasticity of demand for deposits in 
relation to the anchor is 0112
1
>= βαλ ad
dd d . 
In Т2 we obtain: 
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Besides, 11
1
21 βαγ
βα > , because 11 <γ , i.e. the sensitivity of the premium to the credibility of 
the new anchor is growing, which is logical since the external anchor amplifies the internal 
one. This, however, is not the case with period Т3, where the new anchor disables the first one 
and cannot offset it. After the transformation, we have: 
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It is clear that while in the first two periods deposit demand is magnified first by one, then by 
both anchors through reducing the risk premium, at T3 a reversal occurs with non-residents 
starting to withdraw their deposits, or at worst, the inflow quickly subsides. Chart 16 shows 
the presumable relations between anchor λ1 and insurance premium α in the examined periods 
Т1, Т2 and Т3. 
 
                                                 
22 We could presume for example that the premium movement depends not only on the level, but also on the rate 
of growth of foreign reserves dt
dFF 210 αααα −−= . 
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Chart 16 Anchors dynamics and insurance premium in T1, T2 and T3 
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